Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

The Evolution of Political Subdivision Immunity in Ohio

By
Morgan A. Henderson

Key Points: 

  • A.W. v. Board of Education of Twinsburg discusses political subdivision immunity in Ohio. 
  • Appellate court discussed application of political subdivision immunity to public school districts. 

In June 2024, in A.W. v. Board of Education of Twinsburg, 2024 WL 3220270 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. June 28, 2024), an Ohio appellate court issued a decision shedding light on political subdivision immunity in the state. More specifically, the court discussed its application to public school districts. 

The case stems from a physical altercation that took place between two minors, referred to as A.W. and M.G., on school property. Shortly after the fight began, school personnel intervened to break up the students. After the altercation, A.W. was sent home from school without receiving medical attention. Within 24 hours of the attack, A.W. sought treatment at an emergency room because she was suffering from severe headaches, nausea, and vomiting. She was ultimately diagnosed with a concussion.

On March 17, 2023, A.W. and her parents filed a complaint in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against M.G., his parents, and the Twinsburg City School District Board of Education. The complaint alleged causes of action against the Board for recklessly failing to exercise control of a student, negligently failing to exercise control of a student, recklessly failing to provide necessary medical attention, and negligently failing to provide necessary medical attention. 

After the complaint was filed, the Board filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, as a political subdivision, it was entitled to immunity pursuant to Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code. The plaintiff did not respond to the motion, but it was, nonetheless, denied by the trial court. In its denial, the trial court found that the complaint pled sufficient material allegations to show the Board was not entitled to political subdivision immunity. 

The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act is codified in R.C. 2744.01, and it establishes a three-tiered analysis for determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability. “Under the first tier of the analysis, political subdivisions enjoy a general grant of immunity for any injuries, deaths, or losses allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or [its] employee in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” Hortman v. Miamisburg, 110 Ohio St.3d 194, 196–197 (2006). The second tier requires an analysis as to whether an exception applies to a political subdivision’s comprehensive immunity. The exceptions are as follows: 

  1. injury, death, or loss caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by a political subdivision’s employee;
  2. injury, death, or loss caused by the negligent performance of acts with respect to proprietary functions;
  3. injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by their negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public roads;
  4. injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function; and
  5. injury, death, or loss to person or property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code.

Under the third tier, immunity may be restored, and the political subdivision will not be liable if one of the defenses enumerated in R.C. 2744.03(A) applies. Moss v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation, 185 Ohio App.3d 395, 401 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 2014) .

As for the first tier, it was undisputed that the Board is a governmental agency/organization and, therefore, is granted broad governmental immunity. With regard to the second tier, however, the plaintiff argued that the Board was not entitled to immunity because it was engaged in a proprietary function—the second exception under R.C. 2744.01. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the Board engaged in two proprietary functions: Failing to control M.G., thereby allowing him to attack A.W., and failing to provide A.W. with medical attention following the attack. The trial court agreed, holding that the Board may be liable for injury to a person caused by negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to providing a public school education.

On appeal, the Ninth District disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion, holding that “neither the Board nor its employees were engaged in proprietary functions as required.” The appellate court further explained that R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(c) specifically designates “[t]he provision of a system of public education” as a governmental function. The Board’s exercise of control over the students and its provision of medical care for the students cannot be deemed proprietary functions under existing law. These functions must be strictly categorized as governmental functions. Therefore, the Board must be granted immunity under R.C. 2744.01. 

Morgan is an associate in our Cincinnati, Ohio, office. 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.