The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend a complaint because the claimant acted with undue delay and offered no credible explanation for the new theory of recovery.

Michele Evans brought this employment action against the City after she was terminated from the Philadelphia Police Department following a positive drug test. Evans’ initial complaint asserted claims for disparate treatment race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After the City filed a motion for summary judgment and four months after the close of discovery, Evans moved to amend her complaint to add a disparate impact claim under Title VII. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Evans’ motion, concluding that Evans acted with undue delay and that the amendment was futile because she could not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.

This decision makes it clear that the appellate court will not be sympathetic to plaintiffs who wait until the eve of trial to assert new theories of liability. 

^{Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2019}

^{Case Law Alerts is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2019 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.}